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abstract: The concept of planning horizons serves as a measure of many unsettled 
aspects of economic analysis. first and foremost, the notion is ordinal: we speak 
of ‘horizon effects’ as directional shifts in planning horizons without tallying 
‘wits’ or calibrating horizonal axes of change. second, the derivation of horizon 
effects is inductive; we simply assert their inherence in the range of factors 
subsumed within the imagined projections behind all choice. The planning 
horizon is set wherever surprise supplants expectation; the horizon occurs at 
the outer range of accurate anticipation, to which we lack clear epistemological 
access. Planning horizons – horizon effects – suggest a new foundation for an 
ethical economics of conscience, social maturation and growth.
The idea of planning horizons invites a distinction of foresight from myopia in 
economic constructions. But time horizons are only one aspect of our planning 
horizons: to see ahead in time we must embrace all relevant causal effects. 
foresight depends on knowledge of how reality actually works, which is a 
matter more of degree than ‘truth’; the planning horizon offers an index of our 
‘rational bounds.’ our range of anticipation is also related to our internalization 
of social and ecological externalities in our decisions, so to the scope of our ethical 
conscience and to our sense of human community. indeed, the organizational 
health and integrity of our society is horizonal in this sense.
The aim of this paper is to explore and develop the concept of planning horizons 
in its intellectual origins and economic concerns. its philosophic conceptual 
roots, methodological underpinnings, psychological insights and economic 
implications are outlined to show why an economics of planning horizons 
offers an ethical economics of interdependent dynamic complex systems. With 
standard doctrines seen as a special case in a larger horizonal frame, social The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 3
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theory embraces an ethical economics with dissimilar institutional implications 
favoring cooperation.
Keywords: planning horizon, ethics, conscience, complementarity, myopia, horizon 
effects
introduction
The first part of this two part discussion of planning horizons and their relevance 
outlined the microfoundations of this concept along with some applications. This 
second installment describes their role as an ethical ground for economics. The 
planning horizon offers an ordinal index of conscience, knowledge, maturity, 
foresight, patience and perspective. indeed, the notion entails an ‘organizing 
principle’ on which economics will likely restructure, once the implications of 
this idea are fully engaged. The previous paper explained how planning horizons 
affect the pricing decision, as an extension of orthodox theory into network 
contexts of fully interdependent decisions suggesting that cooperation is efficient 
due to contagious horizon effects and the complementarities of increasing returns 
(Kaldor, 1972; 1975) and intangible goods. indeed, the balance of human relations is 
horizonal in this sense: longer and broader horizons shift our interdependence away 
from substitute tradeoffs to complementary gains. But what are planning horizons 
in their relation to other writings and traditions in economics? That is the aim of 
this sequel to the paper on market design.
first, there is a history of attempts to incorporate time and dynamics into 
neoclassical theory that will be briefly addressed. There has been a long 
conversation in economics on how we should integrate dynamic concepts into our 
models, suggesting that time is not enough for any emergent theory of cost. The 
methodological lesson is about temporal limits on anticipation as seen in horizonal 
theory. The planning horizon undoes such cautions, solving the problem of how to 
conjoin knowledge with pricing in network contexts, shaping economic growth as a 
horizonal process (Jennings, 2011b). 
once horizonal links to pricing and growth are understood (cf. Part 1), then 
discussion turns to what the planning horizon brings into sight. Therefore, the next 
section deals with its epistemological status as an inductive entropic concept defined 
in ordinal terms: one never reports on number of ‘wits’; instead we focus on how 
horizon effects shape patterns of choice, where a horizonal economics shall involve The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 4
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ethics at every step. indeed, the planning horizon as an organizing principle limns 
how horizon effects shift static constructions. so little is known thus far on how 
horizons affect behavior, planning horizons open new opportunities for economic 
analysis.
after recounting its substantive value and meaning, the paper reviews some more 
interdisciplinary implications of the planning horizon. for example, its social and 
psychological links open new ways of framing complex options in choice and how 
these constructs shape our resulting actions and emotional life. Philosophy also will 
play a role in our economic constructions, showing their relentless selective foci and 
the restrictive visual blindness so embedded therein. Just as a longer time-horizon is 
a result of factual learning and knowledge of how things work, horizonal theory is 
similarly inclusive in its sweep and domain. To bring horizon effects into economic 
consideration exposes stubbornly isolated doctrines to new realms of phenomena 
outside disciplined demarcations.
in sum, the paper reports on how the notion of planning horizons shall open new 
realms of economic effect to research and analysis, showing how equilibrium 
models standing on substitution assumptions shrink into a special case within 
a larger horizonal frame. as substitution assumptions cede to complementary 
interdependence (static and horizonal), then ethics, psychological linkages and 
common needs swim into view with many novel insights in need of further research. 
This paper offers a start to unfolding complementarity’s secrets, still largely 
unknown and so inviting greater reflection on generally unexplored domains of 
vital economic concern.
The basic concept of planning horizons in  
their historical context
The basic concept of choice from which the planning horizon emerges comes from 
Boulding (1956), shackle (1955, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1978) and simon (1981, 1982-97). 
The notion is inductive and derived under realistic conditions, so there is no ‘homo 
economicus’ seen in any such process. indeed, one could define any act of choice as 
‘a normative process of multidimensional causal projection’ that is horizonal at its 
core. every decision we make is based on imagined projections of outcomes standing 
on theories of how the world works, so ‘if i do this, then that will occur’ for a range 
of fluid choices. The only options on which we ever have any empirical evidence The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 5
Jennings, Jr., frederic B. (2012) ‘a theory of planning horizons (2): the foundation  
for an ethical economics’, The Journal of Philosophical economics, Vi:1
are the ones we choose; we seldom have any factual information on the opportunity 
costs foregone in our ‘roads not taken,’ or even the value thereof in how they would 
have felt like to wear! The role of theory is important: how we frame and design our 
alternatives stands on how our theories structure all the imagined projections in 
choice.
These projections have a horizonal range embracing consequences spreading out 
in social, physical and ecological space. Their reach goes so far and no further, 
reflecting all learning and general knowledge, along with one’s self-confidence, 
stress, security, energy and attention devoted to a decision as well as other internal 
influences, in concert with external conditions at the moment of choice, such as a 
disruptive venue, unpredictable legal effects or reactions of others (especially in a 
myopic culture) and many other restrictive factors. changes in these psychological 
or existential conditions will lengthen or shorten horizons in their range of focal 
embrace. There is a relevant difference between a larger regard to the Big Picture 
and a narrow window restricted to ‘what is good for me right now’! This is the realm 
of horizon effects.
The ethical content of the notion ought to be visible here. in a world of totally 
interdependent causal links, where any act transmits signals of information and 
impact to others, ‘externalities’ seem misspecified and are too often dismissed. 
These external effects are horizonal in their basic conception; they include all 
the consequences left out of decisions. The neoclassical attribution of these effects 
to incomplete markets (cf., e.g., heller and starrett 1976, p. 10) should defer to 
alternative views, such as: “externalities … reflect conceptual difficulties at the 
boundaries of microeconomic theory … where deductive explanation becomes 
unsatisfactory” (Krupp, 1963:223) due to fully interdependent socio-ecological 
systems in which our rational limits set the analytical bounds of our representations 
(Georgescu-roegen, 1970:2-3). [1]
indeed, the most serious flaw in neoclassical economics stems from its analytical 
boundaries. Textbook constructions start with ‘given’ cost and demand curves as 
external data and not as imagined projections of foregone, unexplored options. as 
simon (1981:103) described this situation:
There is a certain arbitrariness in drawing the boundary between inner and outer 
environments of artificial systems. …We might well have considered the business 
firm’s cost function to be part of the inner environment. instead… The cost function 
was treated, along with the demand function, as part of the outer environment to 
which the firm was seeking to adapt.The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 6
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This is a serious source of error, which has served to forestall understanding and 
embrace of the subjective foundations of economics and the role of cognitive factors 
in economic behavior. expectations – central to all decisions – stand as the key 
to economic complexity and dynamics, especially in regard to time and learning 
in economic development (Jennings, 2011b). some of our greatest economists have 
foundered on these questions.
There has been a long conversation among economists on the subject of time in 
relation to cost and pricing, from marshall (1890) and Knight (1921) through 
stigler (1939) and clark (1940,1955) to alchian (1959), Turvey (1969) and others. 
The upshot of this series of papers is that time must be embedded in economic 
analysis, but its subjective foundations have not been adequately explored and 
developed. Time and positive feedback (complementarities) should be appended 
to (if not dominate) the negative feedbacks supposed throughout economics in our 
substitution assumptions (senge 1990:79-80). a critical step in this direction is to 
incorporate planning horizons, where time horizons relate to this broader concept 
through our interdependence: for real decisions, the way you extend your projections 
in time is by apprehending effects in social and physical space, since that is where 
reactions emerge in the form of feedback constraints. so time horizons are reflective 
of full awareness and knowledge, and they extend or retract in response to our 
understanding of causal relations. indeed, ‘horizon effects’ – ordinal changes in 
planning horizons – serve as an entropic measure of organizational learning applied 
to economics in Boulding’s (1956) and Georgescu-roegen’s (1971) sense (Jennings, 
2009b). They also reflect the maturity of a culture and its citizens, showing the 
harmful impact of our rivalrous social learning process in its effect on human 
development. indeed, competition is keeping us stupid, childish and disengaged, 
thwarting community and complementary yields (Jennings, 2011b).
Planning horizons defined and discussed
so what is the ‘planning horizon’? Boulding (1956:25-26) describes a process of 
image formation in the way we think, where learning entails an increase in the 
closeness of ‘fit’ between image and truth:
… it is the capacity for organizing information into large and complex images which 
is the chief glory of our species. … our image of time … goes far beyond that of the 
most intelligent of the lower animals, mainly because of our capacity for language 
and for record. … The human being … is firmly located in a temporal process. … The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 7
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Because we are aware of time, we are also aware of cause and effect, of contiguity and 
succession, of cycles and repetition.
… Because of the extended time image and the extended relationship images, man 
is capable of ‘rational behavior,’ that is to say, his response is not to an immediate 
stimulus but to an image of the future filtered through an elaborate value system. his 
image contains not only what is but what might be. it is full of potentialities as yet 
unrealized. … Because of his extended image, he is also capable of organizing his own 
experience in ways that will extend the image further. This is the essence of science 
and the scientific method. … it has led … to an enormous extension of [man’s] image 
both in time and space and in relationships in the course of the past two hundred 
years.
The planning horizon is an ordinal index of these images’ range, where it will open 
or close, broaden or narrow, responding to dynamic change. Boulding (1956:93) 
characterizes the learning process in this way:
The problem of the transformation of images is of great importance in the theory of 
economic development. … The problem here is that of the initiation and imitation 
of superior processes. Both these phenomena require transformation of the image; a 
new process always starts as a new image, as a new idea. The process itself is merely a 
form of transcription of the new image.
simon (1981:104) offered a similar representation of learning phenomena: “long-
term memory operates like a second environment, parallel to the environment 
sensed through eyes and ears, through which the problem solver can search and to 
whose contents he can respond.” The planning horizon is a formalization of simon’s 
concept of ‘bounded rationality,’ in which the images on which we act have a range 
that adapts to existential and psychological influences. simon (1981:132, 223, 228) 
elaborates on this idea:
The artificial world is centered precisely on this interface between the inner and 
outer environments; it is concerned with attaining goals by adapting the former 
to the latter. … Given a desired state of affairs and an existing state of affairs, the 
task of an adaptive organism is to find the difference between these two states and 
then to find the correlating process that will erase the difference. …human problem 
solving is basically a form of means-ends analysis that aims at discovering a process 
description of the path that leads to a desired goal. … The notion of substituting a 
process description for a state description of nature has played a central role in the 
development of modern science.
The issue here is how we move forward, and how we identify any advance and 
measure it in direction. Boulding’s (1962a:139-40) prescience is uncanny on what we The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 8
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might do with such an entropic gauge of organization, if we actually had one. he 
explained that such an index would give us a measure of organizational learning 
and development, knowledge and economic progress, and – presumably – ethics and 
value, because:
The value coordinate is clearly a scalar, like organization. …[B]ecause i have 
some confidence in the generally monotonic character of the relationship between 
organization and “goodness” – that is, that both generally increase together – i would 
argue that the development of a workable measure of organization would at least be 
a first step toward the construction of an ethical calculus. The want of this measure 
however may impede progress toward the solution of many problems, not only in 
biology and in the social sciences, but also in ethics.
This horizonal linkage to ethics stems from a number of features emerging from 
the general approach. even a belief in totally interdependent phenomena (which 
is, after all, the defining characteristic of institutional and ecological economics), 
where – as Georgescu-roegen (1971:66) put it – “Time, space and nature” 
are “seamless wholes” without “joints” for a “carver,” implies a quite different 
economics than mainstream models support. myrdal (1978:772-74) explained how 
interdependence shaped his own intellectual growth:
…i came to see that there are no economic, sociological, or psychological problems, 
but just problems, and they are all mixed and composite. in research, the only 
possible demarcation is between relevant and irrelevant conditions. … …our study 
must take into account the entire social system … [whose] dynamics … are determined 
by … circular causation … There is no one basic factor; everything causes everything 
else. This implies interdependence within the whole social process. and there is 
generally no equilibrium in sight.
one important aspect of this process is that most often, although not always, 
changes which are reactions to a more primary change tend to move in the same 
direction. … This is why circular causation may have cumulative effects. Through 
feedback regularly causing more primary changes to have repercussions in the same 
direction, the results for good or ill may, after some time, be quite out of proportion 
to an initial change impulse of one or several conditions.
The point here is that interdependence and complementarity in combination imply 
that the relevant boundary in economic analysis is horizonal. if every act ripples 
outward forever through social and physical space onto all living creatures with no 
bound (whether we know it or not), the relevant analytical line between known and 
unknown effects has to be our planning horizon. in this regard, Georgescu-roegen The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 9
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(1970:2-3) discussed the need for a “concept of process” in which how we define – 
and where we place – our analytical boundaries shall limit what we can see:
…all that exists in actuality at any moment must belong either to a process or to its 
environment. The basic element of the analytical picture of a process is, therefore, 
the boundary. no analytical boundary, no analytical process. now, precisely because 
actuality is a seamless whole we can slice it wherever we may please. and … actuality 
has no joints to guide a carver. … only our particular purpose in each case can guide 
us in drawing the boundary of a process. … The analytical description of a process … 
reduces to recording everything that crosses the boundary in either direction. …
Georgescu-roegen (1971:213-14) noted again the role of boundaries in our analysis: 
“no analytical boundary, no analytical process.” he adds (in a Polanyi-type 
distinction of focal and subsidiary awareness) [2] that “a boundary must necessarily 
consist of two distinct analytical components. one component sets the process 
against its ‘environment’ at any point of time. …We may refer to this component 
as the frontier of the process. … The boundary must also contain a temporal 
component, the duration of the process.” But total interdependence suggests such 
components are imposed by us on the seamless Whole of the universe, so on what 
basis should we do that? how might we set the frontiers of an integral process, 
and determine duration? in part, this is an issue of scale in ecological economics 
(Jennings 2008a): the scope of the analysis should reflect the scale of essential 
effects within our range of vision, over a time that fits their resilience. But these 
are matters – centrally – of perception, not just of fact, in a world where everything 
ripples outward forever without any end to its impact.
This is where planning horizons serve to bound awareness and conscience: effects 
spread outward forever, but prior knowledge of them does not. The rational limits 
of human intelligence stand as a ‘boundary’ between anticipation and surprise, 
showing a way to deal with interdependence. With no seams out there in the world, 
the only slices are those we impose: our rational limits seem an appropriate choice 
of frontier for our analyses, with an implicit duration in the temporal length of 
planning perspectives.
one of the problems is that we live inside the process studied. The whole system 
moves in concert: dynamic, chaotic, complexly unfolding in patterns seemingly 
of their own making, combining components in new ways selectively understood 
by us. “The new biological conception … the organismic epistemology … is a 
belated recognition of the existence of novelty by combination” that “contributes 
something that is not deducible from the properties of the individual components” The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 10
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(Georgescu-roegen 1967:112, 62; Krupp, 1963). But complex systems – seamless save 
in our science – show where analysis fails with qualitative variation and dialectic 
emergence. [3] how might we encompass such an immensity in our research?
Georgescu-roegen (1971:128-33) saw the entropy law as “the only clear example 
of an evolutionary law … a proposition that describes an ordinal attribute e of a 
given system … a ‘time’s arrow’” of entropic direction. The entropy law states “that 
the entropy [disorder] of the universe increases as Time flows through the observer’s 
consciousness.” indeed, as Georgescu-roegen (1967:93; 1971:194) put it, “our whole 
economic life feeds on low entropy” at the cost of high entropy elsewhere: “life speeds 
up the entropic degradation of the whole system.” his treatment of entropy is about 
order and energy, not about organization, as in Boulding’s scheme.
so Georgescu-roegen’s entropic concept turns on energy usage and its service to 
purposive human enjoyment. Boulding’s view is more institutional, linked to 
organizational theories of learning and human activity. Yet both are in need of 
a unifying conception of entropic change. The interrelation of planning horizons 
with pricing, growth and efficiency offers a novel look at the entropy problem and 
our need to assess it through an organizational lens. some of the most important 
dimensions of entropy in our relations appear within a horizonal outlook. starting 
with interdependence and the challenge of economic analysis in a complex 
systems setting, the entropy law – with respect to energy and organization – 
can be interpreted as a horizonal measure of organizational ‘slack.’ in this way, 
horizon effects shift us along an entropic continuum, measurable with respect to 
improvement in Boulding’s ethical sense (Jennings, 2009b).
Boulding’s statement that horizons are related to “goodness” (ethics) seems in 
line with their relevance. indeed, Boulding (1966:22-23) characterized the 
organizational unit of measure for planning horizons thus:
The question of what is economics can be almost as troublesome as what is 
knowledge? … one longs, indeed, for a unit of knowledge, which perhaps might be 
called a ‘wit,’ analogous to the ‘bit’ as used in information theory; but up to now at 
any rate no such practical unit has emerged. … The bit, however, abstracts completely 
from the content of either information or knowledge… [and] for the purposes of the 
social system theorist we need a measure which takes account of significance… up to 
now we seem to have no way of doing this…
The whole point of introducing the planning horizon is its “significance” in 
Boulding’s sense. his singular anticipation of how this concept would work, The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 11
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contributing to economics in numerous ways, is striking and even astonishing in 
its accuracy and detail. it is as if he saw the need without the concept itself, while 
margolis (1960:531-32, as quoted in Part 1) had the concept but didn’t see the need. 
The role of purpose in guiding attention through our selective focal limits suggests 
a value for reciprocity and trade across sub-disciplines so we all learn from each 
other.
There is a horizonal reason for that. if models unfit to applications are used to 
guide decisions, then planning horizons shorten due to uncertainty and surprise. 
“…The only raison d’être of theory is economy of thought,” where “the choice of 
relevant facts … is the vital problem in economics” and “a ‘simple-minded’ model 
may … be the more enlightening representation of the economic process” (Georgescu-
roegen 1971:15, 340-41). This is why essentiality is as important as realism when 
matching assumptions to applications: if models steering our actions do not fit 
the settings in which they are used, inefficiencies – including conflict and wasted 
resources – result. The closer the fit of theory to fact – the better aligned the 
assumptions are to the extant truths of their application, in both their realism and 
the essentiality of their selective focus – the longer can our horizons be for any level 
of effort. This last is important, as Boulding (1962a:134) explains, since learning 
is not just teaching (or ‘printing’) but ‘inspiration’ as well. The greater our level of 
faith and confidence – in ourselves and those around us – the more time, money, 
attention and energy will be invested in choice, so will our range of projection 
extend. in this sense, social planning horizons serve as a measure of economic 
cohesion and efficiency in an interdependent economy of independent decisions. 
socially, economic coordination is the whole game, but our models must fit to the 
facts for any assurance of value in outcomes. This is my horizonal answer to the 
chicago school approach that favors unrealistic constructions (friedman,1953; 
Jennings, 1968; 1976). and these are not dismissable methodological problems in 
any event: they underlie some serious errors in economics today. as Georgescu-
roegen (1970:9) so wisely observed: “The history of every science, including that 
of economics, teaches us that the elementary is the hotbed of the errors that count 
most.”
in this regard, horizon effects should be seen as a measure of organizational entropy 
and cohesion. When net interdependence is substitution, rivalry is efficient: that 
is well-known to economists. When net interdependence is complementary, it is 
cooperation we want and not competition, which is doomed to fail in this setting. 
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economic efficiency and social welfare. indeed, there is a case that competition 
not only is counterproductive in complementary settings (which Kaldor believed 
was the general case), but also that competition is keeping our (private and social) 
horizons short. This is an obvious corollary to the efficiency of integration under 
complementarity. if longer horizons serve as a measure of organization and 
evolution, then neoclassical economics stands in the way of advance.
a horizon effect – the extension or retraction of planning horizons – should be seen 
as an ordinal shift in a complex balance of framed projections, where resultant 
time horizons are a scalar responding to instant change. others’ planning horizons 
have a major effect on one’s own, as will environmental stability, information and 
knowledge, learning activity, energy and attention, encouragement, hope, self-
confidence and other factors. most of these are ignored in mainstream models of 
economics, so introducing them through horizon effects is a novel leap in itself. 
furthermore, economic systems – in their efficiency, equity, ethics, ecological 
health, and organizational evolution – are driven by planning horizons: this 
strengthens the case for complementarity into a general claim, making cooperation 
– not competition – our means to social improvement (Jennings, 20l1b).
one of the most significant reasons that a horizonal economics is also an ethical 
economics arises from how externalities interact with complementarity. orthodox 
substitution assumptions suggest that phenomena are self-contained, that negative 
feedbacks simply ensure an attenuation of externalities spreading out from our 
actions. if so, they can be safely ignored, damping out and disappearing, allowing 
a partial approach to be used to analyze economic effects. complementarity, on the 
other hand – in the form of positive feedback, cumulative causation or reinforcing 
effects (Berger, 2009) – suggests an amplifying pattern of impact. here, every action 
generates growing outcomes spreading outward to all, making interdependence 
central in our economic constructions. for equilibrium models, standing on 
substitution assumptions, whatever we do will little upset the balance of forces said 
to prevail; for frames supposing complementarity, every act matters a lot to everyone 
else so ethics are relevant here. indeed, the entire realm of economic activity is so 
laden with social effects from private decisions that their morality impacts us all. 
With interhorizonal complementarity, any ethical lapse spreads across society in 
nefarious ways through role model effects, as Boulding (1962b:234) has so well 
explained:The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 13
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…if capitalism is to work successfully, there must be defenses in the society against 
dishonesty. …a good part of the burden must be carried by … the internalization 
of these moral standards in the individual. This is done … by the example of those 
around the individual… for this reason, the building of honesty into a culture in 
which it does not already exist is a difficult matter, for dishonesty tends to perpetuate 
itself through the teaching process which it develops. here again there is a constant 
struggle between the overt and the covert elements in the value system … if this results 
in a collapse of the overt system – in a general lapse into cynicism and the overt 
acceptance of a dishonest covert system – a society is doomed.
so ethics are an essential part of the planning horizon notion, which measures 
our personal growth and maturity in its socially conscientious internalization of 
externalities into our private decisions. one can see this in the horizonal shift 
of economic relations away from conflict to concerts of interest with horizonal 
length. The chief failure of competition is that it has spawned a myopic culture, 
rewarding unethical and immature behavior wrongly founded upon assumptions 
of independence, substitution, tradeoffs, scarcity and individualistic claims. 
so if horizons are ethical indices, some meaningful insights emerge from 
interdisciplinary analyses of their relevance to the relation of economics to other 
realms of scientific query.
extensions and implications
organizational management theorists suggest a relation among conflict, time 
perspective and materialistic consumption in business systems structured on 
hierarchic grounds (cf. simon 1971, p. 204). “man does not generally work well with 
his fellow man in relations saturated with authority and dependence, with control 
and subordination…” (simon 1971:210). interhorizonal complementarity means 
that treating adults like children will bring immature responses. argyris (1971:262-
63, 268-69) said that in these settings mature people will often exhibit signs of 
“frustration, failure, short time perspective and conflict.” These symptoms of illness 
will lead to organizational fragmentation through “competition, rivalry, … hostility 
and … a focus toward the parts rather than the whole.” if a wrong model is used to 
design any institutional incentive structure, we would expect to observe symptoms 
of organizational stress, such as those argyris states. The impact of substitution 
assumptions on our economic and social grasp of organizational process has been 
nothing short of disastrous, showing costs in awareness and actions. some of these The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 14
Jennings, Jr., frederic B. (2012) ‘a theory of planning horizons (2): the foundation  
for an ethical economics’, The Journal of Philosophical economics, Vi:1
costly effects stem from impersonal learning and knowledge. [4] Kaplan (1985:478) 
drew a connection to positivist information theories:
here is the shortcoming of applying to interpersonal communication the 
depersonalized model so useful in the mathematical theory of information. in 
that model, coding by the transmitter and decoding by the receiver are separable 
and independent processes. in the life of dialogue, however, there is a continuous 
interaction… What is happening is not transmission … but the emergence of a shared 
meaning… The interchange is not just communication but a species of communion by 
which alone … each participant in the dialogue first becomes a person.
in this sense, organizations survive and thrive on cooperation, where reciprocity and 
a budding respect for each other rule the day. a paper by Katz and Georgopoulos 
(1971:136-38) shows how the roles of ethics, social values and cooperation are 
important to organization thus:
The great need of our time is a reformulation of social values. … in the first place, 
research and observation show that the norm of reciprocity, of cooperation, of 
mutual helpfulness, runs wide and deep. organizations could not exist without 
many uncounted acts of cooperation which we take for granted. … in the second 
place, justice and fairness are not outmoded values. … it is important to emphasize 
the importance of justice and fairness in the operation of an organization and 
to introduce reforms where inequity is the practice. in the third place, social 
responsibility … has a potential that remains to be developed. … all of these values 
are related to … the democratic ethic which is still our basic creed. … organizational 
reform needs such a value base both as a set of social principles and as guidelines for 
action.
The point is about the harmful effects of authoritarian or hierarchic conceptions of 
organizational structure reducing cooperation. all this says that dominant features 
of our economic culture result from organizational stress stemming from improper 
representations in the design of our institutions, showing express psychological 
symptoms of ill health including conflict, competition, materialism, myopia and 
disruption of effort. Why is this occurring? as simon (1981:167) outlined the issue 
in a more specific context: “a design representation suitable to a world in which 
the scarce factor is information may be exactly the wrong one for a world in which 
the scarce factor is attention.” here we have a similar problem of organizational 
structure resting on substitution assumptions in a context of complementarity, 
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abraham maslow (1954, 1968) offers some answers in his theories of self-
actualization and stages of human development, in which basic consumption needs 
(shelter, food, clothing, etc.) are materialistic in nature, that – once satisfied – 
bring forth higher-order, less tangible needs: this implies our relations shift away 
from substitutional goods in favor of complementary yields as we mature and grow. 
in that case, our institutions should also evolve away from competition in favor 
of cooperation or social advance is stifled due to higher-order need deprivation 
(Jennings, 2011b); this is a likely source of these symptoms of organizational stress. 
mcGregor (1971: 310-11), a well-known organizational management theorist, 
described the problem:
The deprivation of needs has behavioral consequences. … The man whose needs for 
safety, association, independence or status are thwarted is sick, just as surely as he 
who has rickets. We will be mistaken if we attribute … passivity, or … hostility, or … 
refusal to accept responsibility to … inherent ‘human nature.’ These forms of behavior 
are symptoms of illness – of deprivation of … social and egoistic needs.
mcGregor related these symptoms of deprivation to rampant consumerism and 
materialism, because “it becomes more important than ever to buy the material 
goods and services which can provide limited satisfaction of the thwarted needs. 
although money has only limited value in satisfying many higher-level needs, it 
can become the focus of interest if it is the only means available.”
The major implication of horizonal theory is that the nature of human relations is 
not substitutional but complementary. if so, competition is not just stifling output of 
intangibles but is shortening planning horizons in an increasingly myopic culture, 
revealing insidious symptoms of higher-order need deprivation. But these horizon 
effects cannot be seen without a horizonal theory; a corollary of selective focus is a 
restrictive blindness.
Part of the problem arises from the relation of substitution to externalities in its 
warrant to partial equilibrium models. in a world of complementarity, we cannot 
escape from interdependence and bounded rationality, so either a systems approach 
is required or a network conception. here we find no objective viewer outside the 
contexts studied; we are enmeshed in the process. When we are part of our analysis, 
systems subsume mechanistic constructions within network models. so how we 
analyze social and natural systems from the inside demands further reflection. 
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systematization,” as distinct from “its euclidean counterpart … dispenses altogether 
with … axiomatic supports” and it replaces…
…stratification of theses into levels of … fundamentality by a conception of 
enmeshment. …The network appeal is unreductive. ... [it] shifts the perspective 
from unidirectional dependency to reciprocal interconnection. … a heavy charge 
can be laid against the euclidean model on grounds of the enormous hold it has 
established on philosophical and scientific thought in the West. its exclusion of 
circles and cycles on grounds of their violating … aristotelian logic against ‘circular’ 
… reasonings impeded the conceptualization of reciprocal causal models in science for 
over two thousand years.
as ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968:45), an early founder of systems theory, 
expressed it: “in the world-view called mechanistic … causality was essentially 
one-way… …This scheme of isolable units acting in one-way causality has proved 
to be insufficient. …We must think in terms of systems of elements in mutual 
interaction.” Bertalanffy (1968:87-88) added that:
The mechanistic world-view found its ideal in the laplacean spirit – i.e., in the 
conception that all phenomena are ultimately aggregates of fortuitous actions of 
elementary physical units. Theoretically, this conception does not lead to exact 
sciences outside the field of physics… Practically, its consequences have been fatal 
for our civilization. … We believe that … general system theory … may be destined 
… to play a role similar to that of aristotelian logic in the science of antiquity. The 
Greek conception of the world was static… in modern science, dynamic interaction 
appears to be the central problem in all fields of reality. its general principles are to 
be defined by system theory.
Where orthodox standards see market failure, systems approaches find theory 
failure: “…reasoning which abstracts from externalities cannot be applied to a 
situation in which they are present” (nove 1969:852), because: “market information 
… is inaccurate when interdependent activities are decentralized...” (malmgren, 
1961:419). The substitution assumptions so enamored in economics steer attention 
away from meaningful issues such as interdependence and its sundry implications. 
some of our resulting exclusions appear in dynamic complex systems and the 
analytical lessons we have avoided thereby. one important issue is that a system 
must be positional in its structured design, so will not conform to rigorous standards 
(Jennings, 2009a:52-53). an implication of this dimensional aspect of system models 
is that the whole is not derivable from its separate elements (angyal 1941:20-27). 
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52), a philosopher, put it thus: “at the center of Western culture… are faulty 
presuppositions about otherness … mainstream Western culture views … otherness 
… as adversarial. it presupposes that opposition is fundamentally conflictive, rather 
than complementary…”
furthermore, all living systems are open, not closed, demanding another way of 
thinking on the importance of flexibility and diversity as a means of coping with 
evolving complexity. as Trist (1985:167-73) put it:
facing a future of increasing complexity means trying self-regulation within 
interdependence, learning how to cultivate the new logical type. … a negotiated order 
will need to be founded on collaboration rather than competition, collaboration being 
the value base appropriate for the adaptive cultivation of interdependence. … This 
change to a new logical type … requires a reversal of the customary relations between 
competition and collaboration.
systems theory is also adaptive, flexible and dynamic, composed of three basic 
components (senge 1990:79-80): substitution or negative feedback; complementarity 
or positive feedback; and delays or lags in the sense of a time horizon. These central 
concepts stand in the core of horizonal theory, as addressed above. The ‘tightness’ 
of feedback control loops strengthens system efficiency, integrity and stability 
in the regulation of organization. This, said in a different tongue, is similar to 
an internalization of externalities through rules and localization of feedbacks, 
so encouraging greater responsibility and more social engagement. The better 
our knowledge of causal relations, the tighter these loops will be; organizational 
learning in a systems analytic context denotes a more expansive view: “inquiry … is a 
reaching out of a human being beyond himself to … what he … or … the world could 
be.” (churchman, 1971: 275) is there any better representation of a horizonal process 
of entropic growth? churchman (1979:200) described the requirements of a learning 
environment thus: “the environment which the inquiring system critically needs is a 
cooperative environment … because inquiry is evidently needed to create cooperation 
and cooperation to create inquiry.”
understanding the self-reinforcing character of substitution assumptions and their 
institutional lessons shall be important too. Believing “that people are motivated by 
self-interest and by … power and wealth” will lead to precisely these human traits as 
“self-fulfilling” effects of organizations so designed (senge, 1990:274). as Badaracco 
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if people are assumed to be motivated only by self-interest, then an organization 
automatically develops a highly political style, with the result that people must 
continually look out for their self-interest in order to survive. an alternative 
assumption is that, over and above self-interest, people truly want to be part of 
something larger than themselves. … When organizations foster shared visions, they 
draw forth this broader commitment and concern.
as hawken (1999,19-20; 1994) put it so well: “We are surrendering our living 
systems, social stability, fiscal soundness, and personal health to outmoded economic 
assumptions.” Walt Kelly (1987) sums it up: “We have met the enemy and he is 
us.” substitution assumptions do not describe the nature of human relations which 
are mostly complementary. if so, competition is stifling and not encouraging growth 
in any sense: social, personal, or ‘economic’ (Jennings, 2011b). cooperation is what 
we need to resolve our cultural ills.
simon (1983: 107) ended his series of lectures at stanford on “reason in human 
affairs” with an open appeal for broader horizons and greater responsibility:
reason ... is instrumental. it can’t select our final goals... all reason can do is help 
us reach agreed-on goals more efficiently. ... it would be quite enough to keep open 
for our descendants as wide a range of alternatives as our ancestors left for us... in 
accomplishing [this] more limited goal, will an appeal to enlightened self-interest 
suffice? ... success depends on our ability to broaden human horizons so that 
people will take into account, in deciding what is to their interest, a wider range 
of consequences. it depends on whether all of us come to recognize that our fate is 
bound up with the fate of the whole world, that there is no enlightened or even viable 
self-interest that does not look to our living in a harmonious way with our total 
environment.
simon’s inspiring close shows the direction in which we must go. expanding private 
and social horizons is not a straightforward task, given the culture economists have 
encouraged through our substitution assumptions and their wrong institutional 
links showing competition as socially optimal. a horizonal economics of learning 
and knowledge is one of complementarity as an inducement to cooperation in 
dynamic complex systems and in network contexts as well. linearity and convexity 
are not appropriate tools in this setting, and no longer can norms of closure serve as 
standards of legitimation (mirowski, 1986:193); an evolutionary approach is sought 
to analyze open systems such as confront us in economics. This will lead to a new 
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conclusion
The main point of this paper is that horizonal economics is also an ethical 
economics in its basic conception. The planning horizon offers an ordinal index of 
foresight and conscience in its internalization of ecological and social effects into 
an agent’s private decisions. indeed, the notion offers an organizing principle for 
economics, including all learning activity (in Boulding’s sense of that term) and 
time preference (or impatience in its effect on discount rates), personal growth and 
maturity (in its impact on the balance of interdependence in human relations), 
the tradeoff between conflict and cohesion in society (which is surely horizonal), 
ecological health (as an inherently ethical issue), regulation of free market 
processes (needed in any event), and the value of everyone’s welfare to all (implied 
by complementarity). The role of horizons in an economics of interdependence 
and complementarity is central; horizon effects solve the institutional issue raised 
by a network of fully interdependent transactions. Where rivalry and common 
needs appear in a balance of value relations (substitution and complementarity), 
interhorizonal complementarity yields the insight that our interdependence is 
shaped by horizon effects in their contagious spread. The use and abuse of market 
power is closely related to planning horizons in the incentive for growth and 
learning over immediate profit. There are many inviting applications for this 
idea, and new research avenues abound to map its grounds, still largely on terra 
incognita.
The paper reviewed the following points. after a brief outline of what was to come, 
in the second section the act of choice was characterized as ‘a normative process of 
multidimensional causal projection’ of fantasy outcomes standing on theories of ‘if 
i do this, then that will occur’ applied to known options in choice. surprises set the 
bounds of rationality and define our horizons, with the latter restricted to accurate 
theories so error reduces their range. as shown in the previous paper, within 
network contexts substitution and complementarity coexist in nondecomposable 
tangles of complex interdependency, yielding intractable institutional problems 
solved by horizonal theory. interhorizonal complementarity opens to an important 
result that the balance of substitution and complementarity is horizonal, such 
that longer and broader horizons shift our relations away from conflict toward 
a concert of value in all economic contexts. if so, any advancing process of 
economic development turns the acclaimed efficiency attributes from competition 
to cooperation due to a change in the composition of output to complementary 
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neoclassical economics shows in a boundary problem between internal and external 
environments, since cost and demand curves are not thus seen as internal projections 
of unexplored options by a price-setting agent. a cognitive framing of these 
alternatives sets the role of time and expectations in bolder relief, forcing concepts 
of time (and therewith the planning horizon) into the center of economic analysis, 
as suggested by many economists such as Knight (1921), stigler (1939), clark (1940, 
1955), alchian (1959), Turvey (1969) and others. But they concurred that time 
alone was not enough and was far too simplistic. consequently, a theory of planning 
horizons as a subjective frame including cognitive factors should be included in 
economics.
The third part of the paper turned to what the planning horizon is, starting with 
Boulding’s (1956) image and its transformation echoed by simon’s (1981) theory of 
‘artifice’ centered on a horizonal boundary, making horizons an ordinal, entropic 
gauge of organization, knowledge, ethics and development (Boulding 1962a, 1966). 
an embrace of interdependence suggests that our rational bounds are theoretical 
limits, so serve as an analytical boundary in Georgescu-roegen’s (1970; 1971) sense, 
since effects spread outward forever but prior knowledge of them does not. There is 
no external observer; we live inside the process studied, making ethics central to a 
horizonal economics, spreading effects outward to all.
The fourth part of the paper reported on thoughts from management theorists, 
social philosophers and other writers showing how an authoritarian structure 
reinforces symptoms of organizational stress from need deprivation, including 
conflict, disintegration, materialism, myopia, rivalry, hostility and disengagement. 
These stresses stem from incorrect theories (substitution and competition) applied to 
a complementary setting calling for cooperation. This seems an apt description of a 
sick economic culture, resulting from what Pigou (1922:135) would deem to be “the 
falsehoods of charlatanry” in these substitution assumptions so resistant to reform. 
in the three realms of ‘atoms’ (physical goods), ‘bits’ (intangibles) and ‘wits’ (horizon 
effects), substitution only pertains to short-run atoms and nowhere else (Jennings 
2011a). so why are economists so enamored of substitution and competition, while 
learning and understanding so little about the implications of complementarity 
and cooperation? management theorists seem to know why cooperation is so vital to 
organizational function, while we economists simply ignore the research as outside 
our realm of study.
Yet the founder of systems theory (Bertalanffy, 1968:88) opined that “dynamic 
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principles are to be defined by system theory.” economists seem so resistant to other 
regards – since science survives on open minds – maybe the underdevelopment of 
economics, so well lamented by Phelps Brown (1972), is from academic competition 
among complementary yields (Jennings, 2008b). if so, a relentlessly myopic culture 
– rearing its head to engulf us in ethical losses, ecological crisis, short-term motives 
and trivial license – is due to economists’ stubborn adherence to wrong ideas and 
assumptions. We have met the enemy. are we courageous enough to admit this, so 
to adapt and change? earl (1983:121) described the dilemma: “if a mature scientist 
is to undergo a personal scientific revolution she will have largely to dispense with 
a well-formed world view. since the choice will not usually be clear-cut, such a 
transition, if made, would entail a period during which she suffered nothing short 
of a scientific nervous breakdown.” [5] That is what we must face, to be reborn and 
grow a new economics.
endnotes 
[1] cf. Krupp (1963: 221-26), who discusses externalities in their relation to 
composition laws in an insightful way:
among the axioms that determine theoretical scope are the composition laws. 
composition laws govern the extension of relationships derived from the micro-units. 
… The type of composition rule which may be applied to units depends on … their 
interdependence. …
The problem of externalities concerns the interdependence that emerges when 
individual units are aggregated with consequences not predictable under theorems 
derived from the individual units. … microeconomic theory fails to provide an 
adequate theory of the economic consequences of direct interdependence. … at 
present, the difficulty of adapting theorems drawn from axioms about independent 
units to permit handling phenomena of common interdependence must be recognized 
as a major structural problem in microtheory.
[2] any exclusive attention to one thing also ignores all else: selective focus is also 
restrictive blindness at the same time. michael Polanyi (1958:56-57) remarked that: 
“subsidiary awareness and focal awareness are mutually exclusive. … all particulars 
become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which they jointly constitute.” he 
expands on this in Polanyi (1961:128-29):
…Particulars can be noticed in two different ways. We can be aware of them 
uncomprehendingly, i.e., in themselves, or understandingly, in their participation in The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 22
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a comprehensive entity. … in the first case therefore we may say that we are aware 
of the particulars focally; in the second, that we notice them subsidiarily in terms of 
their participation in a whole. …
We can formulate this difference in terms of meaning. … in the first case, 
unspecifiability impedes the analysis of a given meaning; in the second case, it 
restricts the discovery of an unknown meaning. …
[3] Georgescu-roegen (1971, p. 67) remarks:
…The impossibility of defining formally the intuitive continuum is a logical 
consequence of the opposition between the essential property of numbers to be 
distinctly discrete and the characteristic property of the intuitive continuum to 
consist of dialectically overlapping elements leaving no holes.
[4] how economists ever adopted a scientific conception negating consciousness, 
solely open to objects observed, is simply amazing to anyone not tuned in to 
positivist theory. Though realism and reason are on the rise in modern philosophy, 
economists still labor under the spell of laplace’s dream of impersonal knowledge 
and objectivity in a humanless social science. Polanyi (1958:139-42) offers some 
insight to this:
The ideal of strictly objective knowledge, paradigmatically formulated by laplace, 
continues to sustain a universal tendency to enhance the observational accuracy and 
systematic precision of science, at the expense of its bearing on its subject matter. 
This issue [is part of] … a wider intellectual disorder: namely the menace to all 
cultural values, including those of science, by an acceptance of a conception of man 
derived from a laplacean ideal of knowledge and by the conduct of human affairs in 
the light of such a conception.
Georgescu-roegen (1967:104) noted the insidious strangeness of this view, especially 
in social science:
from time indefinite, the natural sciences have cherished a positivist epistemology… 
objectivity ... requires then that a proper scientific description should not include 
man in any capacity whatsoever. … however, for a science of man to exclude 
altogether man from the picture is a patent incongruity. nevertheless, standard 
economics takes special pride in operating with a man-less picture. …
[5] The dominant paradigm in economics is still equilibrium models, surrounded 
by a protective fringe of zeal like a moat guards citadel walls. Blaug (1976:156-57) 
characterized lakatos’ view of the hard core of assumptions underlying a research 
program thus: “The ‘hard core’ is irrefutable by ‘the methodological decision of its The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 23
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protagonists’.” one cannot challenge or open the gates, since so many alligators 
swarm out that a critic gives up in despair. and this, of course, is the aim. nicholas 
Kaldor (1972: 1240), an advocate of increasing returns and complementarity, 
expressed frustration with this:
in fact, equilibrium theory has reached the stage where the pure theorist has 
successfully (though perhaps inadvertently) demonstrated that the main implications 
of this theory cannot possibly hold in reality, but has not yet managed to pass his 
message down the line to the textbook writer and to the classroom. …Without a major 
act of demolition – without destroying the basic conceptual framework [of orthodox 
equilibrium economics] – it is impossible to make any real progress.
The challenge of facing and engineering change is addressed in Jennings (1999: 
78-79): organizations shall protect against any threat to their identity; appreciate 
that self-preservation is their prime directive (Katz and Kahn 1969:97-98). selznick 
(1948:276) counts “self-defensive responses or mechanisms” among the methods 
adopted by organizations to deal with environmental change, including construction 
of ideologies and cooptation as self-protection. in an intriguing analysis of the 
process of organizational change, Tannenbaum and hanna (1985:100-101) address 
its psychology of “holding on, letting Go, and moving on” as three stages of 
frequently agonizing and painful adjustment. To ease one’s hold upon the familiar, 
anxiety must be confronted.
as psychoanalyst ernest schachtel (1959:195, as quoted in T&h, p.100) insightfully 
explains: “The anxiety of the encounter with the unknown springs … from the 
person’s fear … that without the support of his accustomed attitudes, perspectives, and 
labels he will fall into the abyss or flounder in the pathless… letting go of every kind 
of clinging opens the fullest view… But it is this very letting go which often arouses 
the greatest amount of anxiety.”
Tannenbaum and hanna (1985:108-15) offer a useful insight on the tenacity of an 
organizational effort to defend its identity in a situation perceived as a threat to 
its self-protective values: “all human systems … have boundaries. … That which is 
within the boundary gives the system … its identity (its ego or its self-definition). 
This identity … is experienced by the system as essential to its survival.” These two 
organizational theorists identify a series of steps in “The Process of letting Go and 
moving on” that are: (1) “consciousness raising” (through self-awareness); (2) “re-
experiencing” (as a means of getting in touch with the deeper reasons for holding 
on); (3) “mourning” (“for the loss of the old ways of seeing reality”); (4) “letting go” 
and then (5) “moving on” (“to new possibilities and new ways of seeing things”). The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 24
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They also note that: “The consciousness raising, re-experiencing, and mourning 
make possible the letting go, involving a lowering of defenses, a vulnerability, and 
a receptivity.” They further remark that: “although our focus … has been on the 
individual, …what has been said about the individual has wide applicability (with 
appropriate translation) to all human systems.” The ease with which ‘letting go’ 
is achieved depends upon a number of variables, including: “humanistic values … 
interpersonal trust … stability … realistic patience … [psychological maturity and 
centeredness] … openness … psychological strength … [and] a great need for support 
(particularly psychological support) as a system moves through the process…” They 
offer encouragement to people in this process, suggesting that though what has been 
said implies “that this basic change process is rooted in anxiety and pain… as it 
unfolds, it also releases joy, vitality, and meaningfulness.” Tannenbaum and hanna 
(1985, pp. 118-20) also ask why this subject has been ignored by organizational 
theorists, and offer three explanations:
in conclusion, … it is puzzling (…) that so little attention has been given … to … the 
need to hold on – together with the related facilitation of letting go and moving on. …
This avoidance has … at least three fundamental reasons to explain it…
first, there is a culturally embedded fear and reluctance to explore elements in 
the preconscious or unconscious self… and yet consciousness raising is an essential 
step in dealing with the need to hold on. …
second, there is the culturally grounded and pervasive fear of feelings (…), 
particularly of their expression. most individuals are fearful of their own feelings, 
and they are threatened by and not sure how to cope with the feelings of others. … 
and yet, the re-experiencing of earlier childhood events, together with associated 
feelings … is also an essential step in dealing with the need to hold on.
Third, there is the need to mourn… To mourn means to face death … in order to 
make a rebirth possible. …our intuitions lead us to the possibility that the avoidance 
by managers and change agents of the need to let go … is in part, at least, related 
to a deep fear that involvement in these processes would bring them too close to a 
confrontation with their own mortality.
in closing, we can only leave the reader with a gnawing dilemma. …The area 
to which we have just given our attention is a seriously neglected one… …efforts 
directed at deep change often fail or fall short of desired results because the need 
to hold on and its working through seem to be so persistently avoided. at a time in 
history when the demands for change constantly impinge on organizations, this 
avoidance carries with it most serious consequences. … at present, we have little 
wisdom to offer as to how this dilemma can be resolved. But we do have faith that, 
with an increasing and more pervasive understanding…, it will be resolved in the best 
interests of all participants in organizational life.The Journal of Philosophical economics Vi:1 (2012) 25
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